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POINT I 
THE "GANG" EVIDENCE WAS UNNECESSARY TO ESTABLISH THE 
IDENTITY OF THE SHOOTER, THE MOTIVATION OR CREDIBILITY 
OF WITNESSES OR CIRCUMSTANCES SURROUNDING THE MURDER. 
THE PREJUDICIAL EFFECT FAR OUTWEIGHED ITS PROBATIVE 
VALUE. 
The State asserts certain factual matters in the course of its brief which 
cannot go uncontested. The State, for example, characterizes the party at the 
"Towers" as essentially a gang party. Br. Aple., p. 1,4, and 25. While it may have 
the license to recite "the evidence and all reasonable inferences in a light most 
favorable to (the jury's) verdict," Br. Aple., p. 4, nte. 3, citing State v. Winfield, 
2006 UT 4, f2, 128 P.3d 1171, this assertion is a misconstruction of the evidence. 
For this proposition, the State first references the testimony of Quinn 
McDonough at 222:118-20. It is true that Mr. McDonough testified, over the 
defendant's objection (R. 222:120), that he was "uncomfortable" with the people at 
the party and that there were "toasts" at the keg for "GD" (Gang Disciples) (R. 
222:119), however McDonough nowhere testified that it was a "gang" party or that 
it was a party "attended largely by members of two mutually friendly gangs," as 
the State asserts. Br. Aple., p. 1. There were apparently a variety of unidentified 
people at the party. The record does not disclose the number of persons who were 
there at any given time, how many came and went during the course of the night, 
or, with two exceptions discussed infra, who were specifically gang members. 
l 
The State's second reference is to the testimony of Brandon Wallace at R. 
223:42-44,46-49. Br. Aple., p.2. Mr. Wallace's testimony, over defendant's 
objection that it was "inflammatory and prejudicial," was that he was involved in 
GD and that GD and King Mafia Disciples were "friends in Utah." R. 223:43. 
Neither of these references establishes that the party at the Towers was constituted 
of "two mutually-friendly gangs." Indeed, the witnesses at trial indicated that there 
were people coming and going from the Towers party, going from the Sugarhouse 
party, to the Foothill Boulevard party, to the Towers, back to Foothill, and back to 
the Towers, and so forth. R.221:60, 64, 159; R. 222: 9, 11, 110, 112-114; 
R. 223: 19, 26. 
There is no evidence, for example, that Nick Crayton, who attended the 
party, was a gang member. R. 221:61, 64; R. 222:8, 110, 113, There is no 
evidence that Nick Darringer who purportedly put the party together was a gang 
member. R. 222:221. There is no evidence that the drunk who Quinn McDonough 
testified was earlier in the evening accosted at gunpoint by Mr. Milligan was a 
gang member. R. 221:145; R. 222:236; R. 223:53, 54. Jason Nunnery, who was 
good friends with Brandon Wallace, was not a gang member. R. 221:121. There 
is no evidence that Diablo or Gregorio aka "G" were gang members. R. 221:145; 
R. 222:235, 236; R. 223:63. There is no evidence that Sergio was a gang member. 
R. 223:63. There is no evidence that Diego was a gang member. R. 223:63, 73, 
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80, 93. There is no evidence that Sal was a gang member. R. 223: 52, 73, 80. 
There is no evidence that Joe Jackson was a gang member. R. 221:60; R. 223: 7, 
20, 23, 26, 30, 32,139, 140, 144, 148. There is no evidence that Cody, the 
individual who drove the car in which Mr. Milligan came in to the party, was a 
gang member. R. 221: 142-143, 144, 151; R. 222: 233, 235. There is no evidence 
that Pudge was a gang member. R. 221: 144; R. 222:234. 
The State makes a point of relating the defendant's tattoos to his gang 
affiliation. Br. Aple., p. 5. The tattoos obviously were useful in identifying both 
Brandon Wallace and the defendant, much more than say a birthmark or general 
facial or other physical characteristics might have been, given the fact that the 
tattoos were so prominent and distinctive. Appellant's obvious and essential point 
is that it was certainly not then necessary to relate these distinctive markings to 
gang affiliation. The tattoos spoke loudly for themselves as identifying features 
and no editorializing whatsoever was required to assist the jury in making that 
identification. 
Likewise, it would seem that there was simply no necessity to make a gang 
reference in the altercation between the defendant and Seven which occurred 
earlier in the evening. Br. Aple., p. 6. Although it was arguably admissible for 
identification, absence of mistake, or other such purposes, the same reasons as 
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attached to the prior confrontation between the defendant and the "drunk", it was 
unnecessary to relate the incident to such graphic and egregious gang activity. 
Although perhaps a minor point, the State disputes that Jason Nunnery and 
Brandon Wallace were actual cousins. Br. Aple., p. 7, nte. 7. Contrary to the 
State's assertion, Appellant does not make such a hard and fast claim. See Br. 
Aplt., p. 28, wherein it is stated that they were "good friends," which is undisputed, 
and that they were "possibly cousins." Br. Aplt., Id. Appellant's point was and is 
that Jason's testimony was subject as being biased based upon the fact of his 
closeness to Brandon Wallace, who had obvious motive to testify against the 
defendant. Brandon Wallace entered a plea of guilty to a reduced charge of 
manslaughter, a one to fifteen in lieu of five to life for murder; additionally he was 
allowed to enter a plea to a separate pending Robbery charge reduced from a five 
to life first degree felony to a one to fifteen. R. 223: 41, 127, 132. On neither of 
these charges had he been sentenced at the time of his testimony, and he 
acknowledged in his testimony that he was aware of the possibility of leniency by 
the sentencing court and the Board of Pardons in light of his testimony against Mr. 
Milligan. R. 223: 128. The fact of the matter is, in any event, in addition to 
Jason's testimony that he and Brandon Wallace were perhaps cousins and were 
"tight," R. 221:57, Carli Knudsen, who went to the various parties with Jason 
Nunnery, R. 221: 158, testified that Jason told her that Brandon was his cousin. R. 
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221:171. Appellant therefore stands by the statement, Br. Aplt, p. 28, that they 
were "perhaps" cousins. In fact, they were probably cousins. 
There is little question that the gang evidence was helpful to the prosecution 
of this case as the State contends. However, it was in fact "highly inflammatory," 
"prejudicial," and likely to mislead the jury for the reasons set forth in Appellant's 
opening brief. The cases relied upon by the State in opposition to this position do 
not directly address this point. The State relies heavily upon State v. Schwenke, 
2009 UT App. 345. Br. Aple., Points I and II,passim. A Rule 403 question is 
reviewed for abuse of discretion. Id. %9. The court in Schwenke notes that, "the 
question is not whether evidence is prejudicial, but whether it is unfairly 
prejudicial, that is, whether it has 'an undue tendency to suggest decision on an 
improper basis.'" Id. at f 17 emphasis in original, quoting Woods v. Zeluff, 2007 
UT App 84, | 7. 
The facts of Schwenke are not helpful to a disposition of the case at bar. 
Schwenke was a swindler and bilked several victims out of their dairy farms. He 
was convicted of securities fraud. The evidence of which he complained had to do 
with his failure to repay loans for the purchase of cows which were repossessed in 
consequence thereof. Id. at \ 4, 18. The decision stated as follows: 
The pieces of evidence Schwenke challenges meet the definition of 
relevant evidence and have a high probative value. The evidence of 
the $50,000 in loans and the nonpayment for the additional cows 
tended to show that the victims did not retain absolute control of the 
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dairy farm as argued by Schwenke and that Schwenke did not in fact 
have the millions of dollars in investment assets that he claimed to 
have, as well as being pertinent to the issue of Schwenke's intent. The 
evidence regarding initial public offerings was also relevant and 
probative because it was helpful in determining what facts would have 
been material under the circumstances, the statute at issue only 
punishing untrue statements of material facts and omissions of 
material facts, see Utah Code Ann. § 61-1-1 (2006). And any 
possibility of unfair prejudice that may conceivably exist regarding 
these pieces of evidence is small and does not substantially outweigh 
the probative value of the evidence. Moreover, these types of evidence 
are certainly not the type of evidence typically excluded as 
inflammatory. See State v. Branch, 743 P.2d 1187, 1189 (Utah 1987) 
(commenting that the eyewitness testimony at issue "did not have the 
inflammatory potential found in the sort of evidence typically 
excluded," and citing in contrast a case supporting the exclusion of 
gruesome photographs of a crime victim). Therefore, admission of 
these pieces of evidence was not an abuse of the trial court's 
discretion. 
As is patently evident, the inflammatory gang evidence in the case at bar 
does not equate to the subject of cows being repossessed, but to gruesome 
photographs, of the type which would tend to inflame the jury. More to the point, 
there was simply no necessity to bring in such evidence, because its probative 
value was low compared to its prejudicial effect. 
The appropriate inquiry, with respect to the analogous situation, involving 
gruesome pictures, is set forth as follows: 
The Utah Supreme Court has articulated a three-part process for 
reviewing the admissibility of allegedly gruesome photographs: 
First, we determine whether the photograph is 
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relevant. Second, we consider whether the photograph 
is gruesome. Finally, we apply the appropriate 
balancing test. If the photograph is gruesome, it 
should not be admitted unless the State can show that 
the probative value of the photograph substantially 
outweighs the risk of unfair prejudice. If the 
photograph is not gruesome, it should be admitted 
unless the defendant can show that the risk of unfair 
prejudice substantially outweighs the probative value 
of the photograph. 
State v. Barber, 2009 UT App 91, f 57, 206 P.3d 1223 quoting State v. 
Gulbransen, 2005 UT 7, 1134, 106 P.3d 734. Gang evidence tends to be 
inflammatory by its very nature. Consequently, considering whether it is 
"gruesome" is not necessary to the trial court's judgment of whether its prejudicial 
effect outweighs its probative value. The mere mention that there was gang 
involvement is sufficient to trigger a balancing analysis under Rule 403, U.R.E. 
Contrary to the State's assertion, evidence of anyone's gang involvement 
was certainly not necessary for the issue of identity. Identity through both clothing 
and the defendant's distinctive tattoos was clearly established without any 
necessity of relating his tattoos to gang affiliation. He was identified as a man with 
a gun, both through the prior confrontation with a "drunk" at the party and in his 
brandishing the gun against Seven, which latter incident could perhaps have been 
"sanitized" to leave out the highly inflammatory evidence of the gang violation and 
sanction. 
7 
Another egregious example identified in the State's Statement of Facts, Br. 
Aple, p. 12, of the trial court allowing evidence which had no purpose other than to 
inflame the jury was the apparently panic stricken statements after the shooting as 
the police arrived of Jason Nunnery and Quinn McDonough that "KMD did this." 
R. 222:29-30. Trial counsel objected that there was no foundation for such a 
statement; the State countered that it was admissible as an excited utterance. Trial 
counsel responded that this did not take care of the foundation problem. R. 
222:30. The trial court allowed these statements as "excited utterances." R. 
222:31. These statements may or may not have been excited utterances. See, e.g., 
State v. Taliaia, 2006 UT App 474,1f 14-19. The State is correct that a direct 
challenge under Rule 802 U.R.E. is not made. Br. Aple., p. 19, nte. 15. The 
statements were nevertheless subject to a Rule 403 analysis to determine the value 
of any purported relevance, which was sketchy at best, against the prejudicial 
effect, which for the reasons mentioned was very high. 
The State contends that the gang related evidence was admissible because it 
was relevant to the identity of the shooter. Br. Aple., p. 22. This is simply 
nonsense as previously pointed out. The State's position is that, "Detail 
concerning the meaning behind the tattoos was relevant to establishing how 
common such markings were and how likely the identifications were to be 
mistaken." Br. Aple., p. 23. The State notes that, "the tattoos had gang-related 
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meaning was consistent with police information that Defendant had gang 
affiliations." Id. This fact was of no value to the jury. The State also states, "the 
evidence tended to make it more likely that Defendant was not entirely candid in 
his police interview, and it established a potential reason for his lack of candor." 
Id. But is his lack of candor not explained even better by the fact that he well 
knew he was a murder suspect? The fact that he may have had gang affiliations 
was not kept secret by Milligan and it did not play in to the issue of "candor." R. 
221:126-156. 
The State further contends that, "(e)vidence tying Defendant, Wallace, and 
Nunnery to gangs was relevant to their motivation and their credibility, both of 
which were contested below. The evidence explained and corroborated testimony 
from all three that they were reluctant to cooperate with police and to provide 
consistent details about the murder because of their fear of retaliation." Br. Aple., 
p. 23. This is a difficult position to comprehend. Fear of retaliation is hardly 
exclusive to gangs, may have related to the fact that Cecala's family seemed quite 
capable of retaliation itself by the previous incident involving Cecala's brother and 
Brandon Wallace, which got Brandon's brother thrown in jail. It neither bolsters 
nor diminishes the credibility of either Wallace or Milligan to establish their gang 
affiliations. And as previously pointed out, Jason Nunnery had no gang affiliation 
whatsoever. R. 221: 146. So the point of this assertion is lost entirely. 
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The State contends that, "It also helped to explain why Wallace would brag to 
Dumas that he had fired four or five shots at Cecala before tossing the gun to 
Defendant when, instead, he really did not fire any shots: to "sound tough" or 
"sound, like, more than what [he] was" in the eyes of his fellow gang members." 
Br. Aple., p. 23. This was a really farfetched statement for Wallace to make in the 
first place, but sounding tough to one's peers is a well know phenomenon among 
young males of the species, not requiring any particular explanation, and certainly 
does not require a gang context. 
The State contends that gang evidence was necessary to establish the 
context of the circumstances. Id, p. 24. The State cites State v. Downs, 2008 UT 
App 247, H 14, 190 P.3d 17, as authority for the proposition that evidence is not 
prejudicial where it provides a context. Downs also, however, states with respect 
to evidence of possession of drugs that, "the evidence here does not have an undue 
tendency to suggest decision on an improper basis, . . . such as bias, sympathy, 
hatred, contempt, retribution or horror." Id. That is precisely the problem which 
does exist in the instant case; gang evidence elicits, hatred, contempt, and horror. 
The same is true of the remaining cases cited by the State. "State v. Boyd, 2001 
UT 30, H 24, 25 P.3d 985 (admission of evidence of nicknames, chants, and dances 
provided background for the charged crime and was therefore properly admitted); 
State v. Johnson, 784 P.2d 1135, 1141 (Utah 1989) (evidence is admissible where 
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it is relevant to "explain the circumstances surrounding the instant crime"); State v. 
Daniels, 584 P.2d 880, 882 (Utah 1978) (where "evidence has relevancy to explain 
the circumstances surrounding the instant crime, it is admissible for that purpose." 
Br. Aple., p. 24. None of these authorities involve the type of inflammatory and 
highly prejudicial gang evidence involved here. 
The State's contention that, "(t)he fact that the party goers were largely 
members of two friendly gangs explains the quick, one-sided escalation of the 
altercation leading up to the murder." Br. Aple., p. 25. For the reasons argued 
above, this statement is first of all simply based upon a false premise, i.e., that the 
party was essentially a two gang party. The evidence for this is scant: there were 
two people identified as gang members, Brandon Wallace, and Anthony Milligan. 
Any evidence to the contrary, as discussed supra, was simply conclusory and 
lacking in foundation. Even the evidence with respect to the incident involving 
Seven identifies him as a "former" gang member, R. 223: 57, who would likely not 
have participated in running after the vehicle driven by Cecala. In fact, the record 
does not reflect evidence placing any other specific person in the immediate 
vicinity of the victim's vehicle at the time of the shooting. Although the testimony 
is conflicting, notwithstanding testimony that there was a "mob" around Cecala's 
car, the testimony of Jason Nunnery was that people were just standing there, 
"spectating." R. 221: 76. 
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But even if the gang factor may have been a driving force in inciting the 
"mob" which surrounded the victim's vehicle, a conclusion not established by any 
competent evidence, the gang relationship was not necessary to identify or 
establish either Brandon Wallace or Mr. Milligan as participants. They were both 
identified as being involved irrespective of any gang tie-in. And in any event, the 
probative value of any such evidence is far outweighed by its prejudicial effect. 
The State contends that "no one argued that it was a gang related case," 
and that, "the evidence was not stressed to the jury and factored only minimally 
into closing arguments." Br. Aple., p. 25 and 29. This simply is not the case. 
Prosecutor Sandi Johnson, in her closing argument, specifically stated that she 
disagreed with Mr. Shuey that it was not a gang case and affirmatively stated, "this 
is a gang case." R. 223: 157. And of course, from the State's own brief it is 
evident that gang evidence was relied upon throughout the course of trial. The 
State contends throughout its brief that it was vital for a variety of factors, identity, 
lack of mistake or accident, context, et cetera. 
The State contends that, "(t)here was minimal, if any, danger of unfair 
prejudice, and the trial court did not abuse its discretion in admitting the gang-
related evidence generally." For this concluding proposition it cites Schwenke, 
supra, H 18. For the foregoing reasons, Appellant vehemently disagrees, and again 
states that Schwenke is inapposite where such inflammatory and prejudicial gang 
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evidence is likely to give rise to "overmastering hostility." As this Court has 
stated, 
. . . Evidence is to be excluded under rule 403 of the Utah Rules of 
Evidence only if it is unfairly prejudicial, see id. R. 403, meaning it 
has "an undue tendency to suggest decision on an improper basis, 
commonly but not necessarily an emotional one, such as bias, 
sympathy, hatred, contempt, retribution or horror." Woods v. Zeluff, 
2007 UT App 84, H 7, 158 P.3d 552 (internal quotation marks 
omitted). Some of the factors to consider when deciding whether 
evidence is substantially more prejudicial than probative include 
the strength of the evidence as to the commission 
of the other crime, the similarities between the 
crimes, the interval of time that has elapsed 
between the crimes, the need for the evidence, 
the efficacy of alternative proof, and the degree 
to which the evidence probably will rouse the jury to 
overmastering hostility. 
State v. Pedersen, 2010 UT App 38, % 36, quoting State v. Shickles, 760 P. 2d 201, 
295-296 (Utah 1988). 
POINT II 
ADMISSION OF THE EVIDENCE OF A GANG RELATED SANCTION 
WITH RESPECT TO SEVEN VIOLATED RULE 404B, UTAH RULES OF 
EVIDENCE, AND AS PRESENTED ITS PROBATIVE VALUE WAS 
OUTWEIGHED BY ITS PREJUDICIAL EFFECT. 
It was entirely unnecessary to unleash the horror of evidence of Seven being 
punished for a gang related violation by Milligan. As a basis for identifying him, 
there were sufficient witnesses to the fact of the incident, that Milligan was the one 
with the gun, that Milligan brandished it. The incident itself, absent the gang tie-
13 
in, might have been used for all the reasons which the State asserts it was 
admissible, notably opportunity, identity, absence of mistake or accident or other 
non-character purposes as indicated in Rule 404b U.R.E. Coupled with the 
unnecessary primitive and punitive gang drenched nature of the evidence, it 
became highly prejudicial. And contrary to the State's assertion that there was no 
objection to this evidence, Br. Aple., p. 19, it was clearly and specifically objected 
to by defense counsel, who requested a continuing objection which was, again, 
overruled. R. 223: 58. Having made objection time and time again throughout the 
course of trial to gang testimony, defense counsel cannot be faulted for not 
objecting more vociferously, thereby drawing even more attention to the gang 
issue to the jury's attention. 
Appellant stands by the position that this Seven evidence, while perhaps 
admissible without the gang references, was the type of inflammatory and 
prejudicial evidence which was in fact likely to arouse the jury to "overmastering 
hostility." See State v. Shickles, supra, 295-296 (Utah 1988). As noted by the 
court in Shickles, prior bad act evidence is "objectionable not because it has no 
appreciable probative value but because it has too much." Id., 295. 
Such potentially inflammatory evidence must have not only "special 
relevance," State v. Cox, 787 P.2d 4, 5 (Utah App. 1990), but the probative value 
must outweigh its prejudicial effect. The Seven evidence was inadmissible 
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because of its gang related inflammatory nature. No effort whatsoever was made 
to determine if the Seven evidence could not have been presented without such 
references. To the extent that identity was a contested issue, the gang evidence did 
nothing to enhance the State's case, and severely prejudiced the defendant. It was 
the type of evidence as to cause "overmastering hostility." Id. 296; State v. 
Marchet, 2009 UT App 262, 219 P.3d 75,144. 
The State cites State v. Shaffer, 725 P.2d 1301 (Utah 1986), inter alia, as 
authority for the proposition that the 404(b) Seven evidence was admissible. Br. 
Aple., p. 31. However, the type of evidence which was allowed in Shaffer was not 
even close to the type of inflammatory and prejudicial evidence presented by the 
gang references in the Seven scenario, and Shaffer does not treat that type of 
evidence. Shaffer was convicted of first degree murder. He contended that certain 
evidence of prior bad acts, a probation violation, a theft of a wallet and 
identification, and theft of services for failure to pay for a hotel room. Id. at 1307. 
The court in Shaffer determined that all these incidents were properly related to 
one or another of the bases for admissibility under the predecessor Rule 55, Utah 
R. Evidence to Rule 404, U.R.E., "absence of mistake or accident, motive, 
opportunity, intent, preparation, plan, knowledge or identity." Id. at 1307-1310. 
None of the prior bad act evidence in Shaffer was freighted with 
inflammatory and prejudicial gang references and the court concluded that under 
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Rule 45 Utah R. Evid. (predecessor to Rule 403 U.R.E.) that it could not be said 
that the trial court abused its discretion in failing to preclude such evidence on the 
basis that its probative value was "substantially outweighed by the risk that its 
admission would consume unnecessary time, cause undue prejudice, or unfairly 
surprise a party." Id. at 1309, quoting Rule 45 Utah R. Evid. 
The State argues that the need for the gang related evidence regarding Seven 
was "high." Br. Aple., p. 33. This simply is not accurate. The gang relationship 
was entirely unnecessary in presenting the evidence for all of the purposes which 
the State cites as important: [1] the strength of the evidence as to the commission 
of the other crime [or misconduct], [2] the similarities between the crimes, [3] the 
interval of time that has elapsed between the crimes, [4] the need for the 
evidence, [5] the efficacy of alternative proof, and [6] the degree to which the 
evidence probably will rouse the jury to overmastering hostility. Br. Aple., p. 33. 
None of these factors, as set forth in State v. Shickles, supra, 295-96 and Marchet, 
supra, If 44, were either enhanced or diminished by reference to the gang 
evidence. 
As presented, steeped in primitive gang lore and trappings, the Seven evidence 
was inadmissible under both Rules 404b and 403, U.R.E. 
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CONCLUSION 
Having fully analyzed the issues in its opening brief, Appellant believes no 
further response is required and submits the matter. 
DATED this 3 day of May, 2010. 
iRSCHEL BULLEN 
'Attorney for Defendant/Appellant 
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